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I 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. JURISDICTION. This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over ". . . the f ina l orders and judgments of the d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t , . . . ," which Respondent b e l i e v e s l i m i t s t h i s Cour t ' s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to the issue of whether the t r i a l court abused i t s 
d i sc re t ion by according fu l l f a i th and c red i t to an antecedent 
Idaho Decree of Divorce. Appel lant r e q u e s t s t h i s Court to 
e n t e r t a i n on appeal a number of o the r i s s u e s over which, in 
Respondent's opinion, t h i s Court lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n by v i r tue of 
the fac t t h a t t hese i s s u e s a re not r a i s e d by " f i n a l o rde r s " as 
r equ i r ed by Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. A 
discussion of these issues i s found below. 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. This appeal i s based upon 
the Third D i s t r i c t Cour t ' s d i s m i s s a l of an a c t i o n for d ivorce 
f i led in Utah by Appellant on the bas is that an antecedent Idaho 
Decree of Divorce was e n t i t l e d to fu l l f a i th and cred i t in the 
Utah Court . Appel lant has a t t empted to r a i s e on appeal o the r 
extraneous i ssues , which Respondent argues Appellant has no r ight 
to do. In addit ion to the issue Respondent admits i s on appeal, 
Appel lant has a t t empted to e n t i c e t h i s Court i n t o de te rmin ing 
whether or not the t r i a l court has undermined the sovereignty of 
the S t a t e of Utah; whether Appe l l an t ' s r i g h t to r e d r e s s of 
grievances has been v io la ted; whether Respondent's counsel in the 
t r i a l cour t should have been d i smissed by the Court ; whether 
Appel lant was "punished" by the t r i a l cour t for being poor; 
1 
whether the trial court slandered Appellant; whether Appellant 
was given a fair hearing in the trial court; and whether 
Appellant's rights to equal protection were violated. 
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court, in its Memorandum 
Decision of April 29, 1988, abused its discretion by according 
full faith and credit to an antecedent Idaho Decree of Divorce 
entered November 10, 1986, resulting in the dismissal of 
Appellant's domestic action filed in Utah on December 16, 1987. 
2. As stated above, Appellant has attempted to raise 
numerous issues before this Court which Respondent contends are 
not properly before it. Appellant has attempted to raise the 
following issues, which Respondent lists only for purposes of 
identification to this Court, and not because Respondent believes 
they are an appropriate subject for appeal although each is 
treated in the Argument that follows: 
a) Whether Appellant's rights to discovery were 
violated by the trial court; 
b) Whether Peter W. Guyon should have been 
disqualified by the trial court as counsel for Respondent; 
c) Whether the trial court appropriately imposed 
sanctions against Appellant; 
d) Whether the trial court slandered Appellant; 
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e) Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d not g i v e 
Respondent a f a i r hearing below; and 
f) Whether the t r i a l court v iola ted Appellant's 
r i gh t s to equal p ro tec t ion . 
I l l 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Constitution of the United States, Article 1 
Section 4; 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof. 
2. Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of laws. 
3. Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, . . . . 
3 
4. Utah Judicial Code, 78-2a-5(2): 
The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(g) Appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, 
property division, child custody, support and 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below 
and Disposition. On November 10, 1986, Respondent herein 
obtained a default divorce against Appellant herein in the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, Washington County, 
in an action styled Cindy Lou Wiedbusch v. Ronald Troy Wiedbusch 
and numbered 94 65. Appellant had been personally served with a 
copy of the Summons and Complaint on file in the Idaho action on 
October 6, 1986, but failed to respond, resulting in the entry of 
the aforementioned Decree of Divorce. 
On December 16, 1987, more than a full year after the 
entry of the Idaho Decree of Divorce, Respondent filed an action 
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County styled Ronald 
Troy Wiedbusch (Staker) v. Cindy Lou Wiedbusch (Baker) and 
numbered D87-4844, in the form of two (2) Complaints (R, 2-11), 
in which Respondent sought a dissolution of his marriage to 
Respondent and other relief. Respondent was served personally on 
January 11, 1988. (R, 12) Various other documents were filed in 
that action in February, 1988, including an Amended Summons, a 
4 
M o t i o n f o r A n n u l m e n t o f I d a h o ' s D e c r e e , M o t i o n f o r B l o o d T e s t and 
Mof- i in f o r T e m p o r a r y C u s t o d y o f M i n o r Chi 1 d , ( R, 1 5 - 5 1 ) , a l o n g 
, e r :>i is o t ! ler I DCUI ft = n t 3 i IC t ]::: 3r !: :i i: l e n t t :» tl: i:i s apj: e a l 
0 n M a r c l:i I II 9 8 8 , t h e i i n d e r s i g n e d e n t e r e d h i s 
a p p e a r a n c e a s c o u n s e l f or R e s p o n d e n t h e r e i n ( R 74 -75 ) On t i i a t 
s a m e -1.ii- - 11 I e i i n d e r s i g n e d ot i b€ I: i a ] f o f R e s p o n d e t 11 f :l 1 e d a 
MOTIOM :• D I S M I S S FOR LACK OF J U R I S D I C T I O N OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER , 6 i 6 6 ) , wl i a red n R e s p o n d e n t a r g i led t h a t t h e d i v o r c e 
b e t w e e n c ,ia p a r t i e s h a d a I r e a d y b e e n g r an t ed i n I d a l i o , * n ^ *- ^  »*-
t h e r e w a s 1111 " r o s " o v < s r ^ l i i c h I h i s C o u r t c o u 1 d e x e r o : s e 
j i 11: :i 3 • ::i :i ::: t: i 11 111 i l u m p s ! 11 m I i n n I' n s p i) i i :i e n t a 3 s o • ::: i i - - 7 , 
1988 moved t h e "Third D L s t n c - Coaci \ a . ^ : . . i ss A p p e l l a n t f-j . h e r 
p e n d i n g mot i o n s (R, 7 6 - 7 8 ) • 
Coi irt to dismiss the "undersigned as Defendan- 's attorney, .-K - --*, 
bas is that the \ indersigned supposedly had access to privileged 
inf 3i:iiiat ion regardi ng Appe] lai I t: ( R 5 3 55 ) . 
On March ] 6, 1988, Appellant responded • : Responden; !s 
. . * , . . . . ? e q u e ? . ,+..:. L o n o f 
D o c u m e r ' •- " 
) i :it 1 1 a ] : • z 1 i 3 8 1 9 8 8 a 3 1! p e ri d :i in gr fit a 1 1 e r s wp =s :i : e 1 i e a r • I 
b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b 1 e S c o 1 1 D a n i e 1 s , P u r s u a n t t o s 1:ipu 1 a t i o n ::»f 
t h e p a r t I. e s i n o p e n c o u r t , a 3 3 m a 1 1 e r s w e r e b e f o r e t h e c o i i r t , 
mgl l 1: :: ' t l i pa i: t:! • B =; ::r ::: i ill < I :: ' t l l e r w :il s- 3 1 I a \* e i: a :i s e d :: b j e :: t i :)iis 
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that pleadings had not been timely filed prior to the date set 
for the hearing. In fact, it was Appellant who set the March 18, 
1988 hearing before the Court in the first instance. 
The Court took under advisement the issue of the 
undersigned's representation of Respondent, but allowed counsel 
to continue to represent her at said hearing. The Court found, 
ruling from the bench, that it had no jurisdiction to determine 
the issues before it on the basis that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution required it to defer to 
the Idaho Decree of Divorce of November 10, 1986 in the absence 
of compelling evidence of lack of service, lack of notice or some 
other basis. The Court's minute entry of March 18, 1988 reflects 
the foregoing (R, 95). 
On March 21, 1988, Appellant filed his MOTION FOR 
REVIEW requesting the Court to reconsider its decision of March 
18, 1988 (R, 103-105). Notwithstanding Respondent's objections 
to the procedure (R, 110-120), the Court again heard arguments on 
April 1, 1988, at which time the Court gave Appellant 10 days 
from April 1, 1988 to provide certain letters and pleadings which 
Appellant stated were relevant, after which time the Court would 
rule, without further hearing, whether the Court would execute 
and enter its previous ruling dismissing the action. At the same 
time, Respondent was granted judgment against Appellant in the 
amount of $150 attorney fees necessitated by the April 1, 1988 
hearing. (R, 109) 
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W h i Il e 11 1 e C :> i 1 1 : I : 1 I • a d 11: i •• n a I: t 3: : i I i i I e r a d v i s e i n e n t , 
R e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a MOTION F' 3R PROTECTIVE ORDER « )i l A p r i J 2] , 1 988 
w h e r e , ) ^ s p o n d e u *o.:q<v 1:his 0 o \ i r t ' s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t 
r • - -^ > . - . , > : i) v e i: ;; r,l,' p r • :> p o i 11 I ci e I b;; ft p p e 1 II a - ' 
while r ie Jourt ie •: er-n La-* A whether or not i t 1 lad jurisdiction. 
(R, I45-:* ^ 
DECISION, w h e r e i a -_he O o u c t found J:ha'- *~ v i s o nvi . .' . * - * . . 
F - - 1 * : .L Liie 'T*~i : - * i S t a t e ? ^ -n *~ •= u »•• -~ * - - -~ 
t h e Idahw >i^>;ree : ,,, x. ^ r c e an- ^Lr.e>;* A , . _ ... _ ; . i • 
i . >~ a b s e n c e :*£ ; ; > n p e l L i n g e v i d e n c e „ • he r ; o n : r a r : . , < ; * z a h 
i • i *• 
1 5 1 - 1 5 4 ) 
T h e i n s t a n t a p p e a I , i n c 1 i i d i n g a 1 1 i s s u e s Ap p e 1 1 a n t 
s e e k s I i i .J i -1i i n i » I i J r - e I I i i. i 11 m I  i n n 1 1 • i II 11 I I 111 I I - ' 11 r M 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 \ 
proceedings. 
2. RELEVANT FACTS. 
a 
Lake C i.t* 
Y , ^ p o n d e n t a n d A p p e l l a n t s e p a r a t e d on o r a b o u t 
S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 : » 
c ^ e s p o a i e ' i r . f i l e d j . - i c t i o n ?•: : a l / / ; r c e : i *• he 
T h i r (I D :i s 11: :iiii : : i 1 : • « , « , «., :, J ., : i ii g t: ., , ^  ; * ., ^ ' * " " - - u L 
S e p t e m b e r 2 9
 # 19 8 7 s t . . ; C i n d y L o i i W i e d ^ ^ s * \ ... ^ ^ - ^ y 
Wiedbusch and numbered J4b5. 
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d) Appellant was personally served, in Utah, with 
process regarding the action in Idaho on October 6, 1986. 
e) Appellant failed to respond to the Idaho 
process, and his default was entered on November 10, 1986. 
f) The Idaho Decree makes as a specific finding 
the following: 
That the Plaintiff [Cindy Lou Wiedbusch 
Baker] now is and for more than six weeks 
last past has been a bonafide citizen and 
resident of the State of Idaho. 
g) Respondent was in fact a bonafide resident of 
Idaho at the time the Idaho Decree of Divorce was entered, as 
reflected in the findings of the Court. 
h) Appellant has not petitioned the Idaho court 
for relief from the Idaho decree on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction or upon any other basis. 
V 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
a) The trial court was obliged to give full faith and 
credit to the Idaho Divorce Decree, and rightfully did so. 
Appellant had the burden in the trial court to convince this 
Court that the Idaho decree was based upon fraud or some other 
basis justifying the relief sought, which Appellant failed to do. 
Accordingly, Appellant failed in carrying its burden of proof; 
the trial court was obliged to accord full faith and credit to 
the Idaho decree; and the Third District Court appropriately did 
8 
SO1. The f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e T h i r d . J u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t 
C o u r t J I Sal' " a k e " ^ n * - v - rno ly su*^-- -*• t h e C o u r t ' s Ct-
1 i rgumen . ^ ..it. ^ a c t i o n r i a l 
c o i j i : / L o i . a t ^ i ': : ^;j'.' .• -i r e d r e s s of j r L e v a n c e . - v - V ' U t 
a " y c ^ " ' a - JLVJIA v i / h d t s o e v e r . 
> .
 t * « . -3 came mnr>t iinnn ^ : , v l , . ; i jiul ' i i . i i g ov * .xr: '- -i "our*: 
1 id1 - l a c k e d j u r i s d i o t io- - ^ *--,- r^ Va - ^ - , ,+- • ^n 
p e n d i r - < > 
a n y ou ' .^ a.;,;. ; W S ^ . A * ^ : _ , 
c ^op*1 h n t ^ii° - ^ s t a n d i n g * ->•:»•• tc • t h e 
i *-- - " - i * \' ^ , m a t t e r . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , - / - -= i ^ * ^ I-M - * - - e ' . v " - j n f l ; : ' t 
i n t e r e s t " - > i - ' ^ r * ^ ^ ^ *~ ^ u n d e r s i ^ e - ; n a s -
£ - - ,• -' : ^ , \ . ^ . ^ * • a ° v : s s ue r= t jL- ;. AJ S 
C o u r t . 
r.r,p "* ] n*" * •:: 1 . • ; ., mi | | I I I I I I I 
s .anaere . ...- * ,-i. cuari : \ .r jive linn i fair 
hearing; -.ha*- *:ht- ' .- a- -.:ourt vio"at^ri "i > r, rights to equal 
pr ote.-*- ; • . -.lied " 
for beia-4 pu^r arc :,,;.!.-,./ -v. .-.;u t .. jundat i ;n whatsoever and 
must -^  dismissed. 
.: • . - • . - ' - - -, i n - r ; o n 
appeal, -everal >r w m c i nave been stricken by :-lis ;ur- -• 1 
several ~f *h ! •* j -vv~ t • t- within :• identifiable s^^viv^ 
argument :i i 
9 
substantial issues raised by Appellant, whether they are properly 
before the Court or not. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
a) The trial court was well within its discretion in 
dismissing Appellant's case below. 
The case authorities are crystal clear that the 
discretionary decision of a trial court is clothed with 
the presumption of validity and that it is the obligation of the 
party claiming error to affirmatively show otherwise. Mayne v. 
Turner, Utah, 468 P.2d 369 (1970); Searle v. Searle, Utah, 522 
P.2d 697 (1974); Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp., Utah, 404 
P.2d 30 (1965) and Corbet v^ Corbet, Utah, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
In the Mayne v. Turner case cited above, the Utah 
Supreme Court Stated at 371 as follows: 
Where the court has a statutory alternative 
based on discretion, we take it that there is 
a presumption that the judge's conclusion is 
clothed with propriety and bona fides 
destroyable only by clear evidence adduced by 
him who attacks it. 
The Searle case cited above, a domestic case, concerned 
an appeal over the trial court's award to the wife of one-half of 
the parties1 assets accumulated during marriage instead of 
alimony. In discussing the trial court's discretion in matters 
of that kind, the Court observed at 700: 
10 
The actions of the tria 1 court are indulged 
with a presumption of validity, and the 
burden is upon appellant to prove such a 
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse 
of iL'S^reti o n [ c i t i n g ] I I" lit: nphreys v, 
Humphreys, Utah, 520 P.2 d 19 3 ( 1974) and 
Harding v. Harding, Utah, 488 P.2d 308 
(1971*. ~~^ 
The ^oo * - - - —M: torth aoo' as L i k e w ' ^ been adopted 
by the sister o M . -. <t Idaho Tr^ * v—^ ^f .jjiir.er v_. E G & G 
Idaho, : , Ina \ - r\ .::•.« M ^ Tdatic Supreme Court, 
in- " det• 3rn iin L I - • * 1i : :i a ] 
C o m m i s s i o n , stated a •••.'* a^ f^Lw^/s: • • 
It . . ^:ondf-l : that v.: ^ ::. • t presume 
error on appeal, but that error must be shown 
affir^a**" '~"!tr n*' ir^pelli^4" ^ ^ *~^ ~ ^ c o r d . 
Als- ;i^  :-• • >f Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co, , 
Inc, , Idaho, /Ox r.^u -t.^ .^ \ I J O J / , tixe Court again stated at 224 
that: 
The appellants have the bi irden ';f~ showing 
reversible error on appeal. Error .>innnh H R 
presumed on appeal, but requires cm 
affirmati ve showing, 
A j ) [ i * M I r l l J * i i " I I i lk i " I ' ' i i 1 -> r i i l " 1 •* I I H i I "IP 
ascertained "^ th undersigned tirrom tiie pleadings ..... ! * 3 MI MILS 
matter, :i s that Respondent was not a bona fide -esident of the 
State :: f • - I< i^i i« » I - <" : * 
D e c r e e of • . - ' , . .:•-• va.> e n t e r e d . -u- ^pp^.,a,, "reie/an : i c t s 
aboi it i ssue A, " pages 11-13, Appellant ' s Brief „__ . ^ . i i - , ^:id 
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 < 1 eI 1 .a : i 1 • : f a i : g \ :i i i: itei: i t c ! i :i s s i l e I , ! ' Page s 21 3( I , 
Appellant's arguments are, at best, a collection of 
disjointed conclusions, apparent v *nat he wishes the facts to 
±1 
be, but in no way reflecting the actual record. Appellant 
apparently confuses the concepts of domicile and residency, 
arguing that the Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to render 
its Divorce Decree because Respondent was not a domiciliary of 
the State of Idaho. In the first place, Idaho law does not 
require that Respondent have been a domiciliary of that state, 
but only that she have met its residency requirements. The 
Decree of Divorce, on its face, states that she did. Appellant, 
notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, has failed to 
produce one iota of evidence to the contrary. 
Appellant attaches great weight to his own self-serving 
affidavit of March 16, 1988, wherein he makes numerous 
allegations of the whereabouts of Respondent between August 18th 
and November 10th, 1986. Even if the trial court were to allow 
this affidavit as "evidence" of fraud on the part of Respondent 
vis a vis the Idaho court, the affidavit simply does not contain 
any compelling evidence whatsoever. Besides suffering from other 
frailties, it does not state how Appellant supposedly came by the 
information it purports to convey; it contains hearsay statements 
of which the Court has no way to determine the validity; and it 
makes other supposed statements of "fact" which are not facts at 
all. The Court simply did not find this "evidence" compelling, 
and properly granted Respondent's motion to dismiss this matter. 
This Court is of course bound to determine the issues 
properly before it on the basis of the record. There is, and 
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given the fact that this is a case in equity, \: review *n- facts 
as well as the law. Even under these circumstances, however, 
Appellant has not met his burden, and his appeal must be denied 
upon application of the following authorities: 
In the case of Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastic Corp., 
Utah, 548 P.2d 1257 (1976), the trial court had granted a 
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the 
long-arm statute. In this regard, the Court stated at 1259 as 
follows: 
. . . on appeal we indulge the presumption of 
verity and correctness of the trial court's 
determination and do not disturb it unless 
the plaintiff has shown that it was in error. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in the 
case of McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996 (1978) as follows 
at 997: 
While it is the responsibility of this court 
to review the evidence in equity cases, it 
will not disturb the findings of fact made 
below unless they appear to be clearly 
erroneous and against the weight of the 
evidence, [citations omitted] 
Furthermore, if there are only questions of fact to be 
considered upon appeal, and not of law, which is arguably the 
case here, the result must be the same. In the case of Knight v. 
Leigh, Utah, 619 P.2d 1385 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court has 
said in this regard as follows at 1387: 
This appeal is based solely upon issues of 
fact and no question of law is presented for 
our determination. The court will not 
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from the presumption of validity. This Appellant has failed to 
do. 
b) Appellant's arguments that the action of the trial 
court in failing to force Respondent to submit to "discovery" 
violated his right to a redress of grievances is without any 
foundation whatsoever. 
It is hornbook law that the trial court has broad 
discretion in all discovery matters and that its decisions 
relating to those matters will not be disturbed upon appeal, 
absent an abuse of such discretion. Bennion v. Utah State Board 
of Oil Gas and Mining, Utah, 675 P.2d 1135 (1983) and Rogers v. 
Fenton, Ariz. App., 564 P.2d 906 (1977). The validity of such a 
position can be seen in view of the purposes of discovery, i.e., 
which, among others, are to prepare for trial and to avoid 
surprise. Lampard v. Roth, Wash. App., 684 P.2d 1353 (1984). 
As has been stated above, in this case, Appellant filed 
written discovery requests. Respondent, at the time the motion 
to dismiss was pending, filed a motion for protective order. At 
that point, it was incumbent upon Appellant, if he wished to make 
an issue of Respondent's failure to respond to discovery, to move 
the Court under Rule 37 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Appellant failed to do. There are no orders that Respondent 
respond to discovery. there are no orders compelling discovery. 
In fact, the entire issue of discovery is absolutely moot, given 
the fact that the matter has been dismissed. 
c) Appellant's objections to the undersigned's 
representation of Respondent are without any foundation 
whatsoever. 
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i) Appellant lacks standing to disqualify 
Respondent's counsel. In the absence of some overriding public 
interest, which certainly does not exist here, an uninvolved 
third-party, such as Respondent, cannot successfully object to 
conflicts of interest. The general rule is that the Courts will 
not countenance a disqualification of counsel based upon a 
conflict of interest unless a former client moves for that 
disqualification. Beck v. Board of Regents of the State of 
Kansas, 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1110 (USDC Kansas, 1983) [citing] In 
re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 88 
(5th Cir., 1976); and Black v. State of Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 
848 (USDC Mo., 1980). 
It is suspected that Appellant's desire is to disrupt 
Respondent's relationship with her present counsel, in the hope 
that such disruption might produce some tactical advantage to 
Appellant. Appellant's supposed objections to representations by 
the undersigned lack substance and are merely illusory. 
Appellant makes vague representations to the Court that the 
undersigned has some knowledge of Appellant that he ought not to 
have, and that such information is advantageous to Respondent. 
In the first place, Appellant never identifies what this 
information really is, and. even more importantly, what 
conceivable effect such information may have on the present 
litigation. There is simply nothing upon which this Court can, 
or ought to, consider as a conflict of interest on the part of 
17 
the undersigned, even if the issue were appropriately raised, 
which it is not. Furthermore, it is the Court's desire generally 
to discourage litigants from misusing motions for 
disqualification for tactical reasons which, it is asserted, is 
Appellantfs intent in this matter. Margulies by Margulies v. 
Unchurch, Utah, 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (1985). 
ii) There exists no prior relationship between 
Appellant and the undersigned which could give rise to the 
instant motion. Courts, in dealing with successive 
representation, from which conflicts of interest claims usually 
arise, have dealt with the problem using the "substantial 
relationship" test. Assuming that the moving party has standing 
to complain in the first place, the moving party must show that 
(1) an attorney-client relationship existed previously and (2) 
that there was a substantial relationship between the subject 
matter of the previous relationship and the matter under 
consideration by the Court. See Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F2d. 1098 
(10th Cir., 1985); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 
F2d. 715 (7th Cir., 1982); and Margulies by Margulies v. 
Upchurch, Utah, 696 P.2d 1195, 1204 (1985). 
Appellant must first fail because he is unable to show 
that an attorney-client relationship previously existed between 
himself and the undersigned. Secondly, Appellant must fail 
because he has not shown that there exists a substantial 
relationship between the subject matter of the previous 
relationship and the matter under consideration by the Court. 
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Appellant cannot show such "substantial relationship" under any-
conceivable set of facts, and has not done so. 
d) Appellant's accusations of slander; lack of fair 
hearing; denial of equal protection; and ill treatment due to 
poverty are entirely without any basis whatsoever in fact. 
Appellant argues that the Court's memorandum decision 
of April 29, 1988 slandered Appellant (Issue i) by stating as 
follows: 
Plaintiff apparently believes that because he 
is impecunious the defendant should be made 
to bear the cost of his decision to proceed 
in propria persona. 
Defamation, according to Prosser, " . . . is an invasion 
of the interest in reputation and good name," and further defines 
it as a communication " . . . which tends to hold the Plaintiff up 
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or 
avoided." Handbook of the Law of Torts, 4th Edition, West 
Publishing Company 1971, pages 737 and 739. 
It cannot be seriously arguable that the statement of 
the Honorable Scott Daniels, in his Memorandum Decision of April 
29, 1988, rose to the level of defamation, as alleged by 
Appellant. However, even if the statement of the Court were 
slanderous or defamatory, Appellant has no basis upon which to 
argue that point in any event, as the following discussion will 
show. 
It is settled law that the statement of the Court, 
where such a statement bears some relation to the subject matter 
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of the proceedings, is absolutely privileged. Drummond v. Stahl, 
Ariz. App., 618 R2d 616 (1980) and Dodge v. Henriod, Utah, 444 
P.2d 753 (1968). 
In the Dodge case, Justice Henriod of the Utah Supreme 
Court made the following written statement in the Court's 
decision dismissing with prejudice Mr. Dodge's complaint in a 
habeas corpus proceeding: 
This case, in our opinion, is an unwarranted 
attempt to abuse justice and judicial 
procedure, a waste of taxpayers' money, and 
one, which if reversed, would permit a 4-time 
felon to repeat and possibly hurt or kill an 
erstwhile, honorable, law-abiding citizen,— 
who just might have a couple of 
Constitutional rights too,—one of which is 
protection of his person, home, wife and 
children against a predator bent on invading 
such rights. 
The Court held in the Dodge case at 754 as follows: 
Since the statement made was in the course of 
a judicial proceeding and in the discharge of 
an official duty, it is declared by our 
statute not to be libelous per se. 
Certainly the statements of Judge Daniels in the trial 
court do not even begin to rise to the level of the statement of 
Justice Henriod, which was found not to be defamatory in any 
event. Accordingly, Appellant has no justification whatsoever to 
assert that he has been slandered. 
Appellant's last Constitutional argument is based upon 
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as 
well as the Constitution of the State of Utah. This, like 
Appellant's other Constitutional allegations, is misperceived. 
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As is succinctly set forth in the case of Sellon v. City of 
Manitou Springs, Colorado, 745 P.2d 229 (1987), the Equal 
Protection Clause is based upon the premise that similarly 
situated persons or property must receive similar legislative 
treatment and that legislative distinctions not based upon 
substantial differences that are reasonably related to the 
persons or property dealt with and to the purpose of the 
legislation are prohibited. See also Malan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 
P.2d 661 (1984). 
The undersigned is simply at a loss to respond to 
Appellant's allegations regarding the Equal Protection Clause. 
Appellant has identified no circumstances to the Court that would 
fall under the umbrella of the Equal Protection Clause. He cites 
no legislative enactments that exclude him and make distinctions 
against him for no reason. Appellant has not cited any case 
where he has been discriminated against because of some erroneous 
legislative fiat. His factual arguments simply bear no 
relationship to the requirements of law within which rights under 




As the trial court found, there is no compelling 
evidence upon which it could have presumed that the Idaho decree 
was obtained by fraud, and was obliged to accord the Idaho decree 
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full faith and credit, which it did. Notwithstanding Appellant's 
protestations to the contrary, and notwithstanding the hundreds 
of pages of "documentation" and "evidence" submitted by him, 
there is not one iota of substantial evidence on the record to 
compel this Court, or even to allow it, to reverse the trial 
court's decision. 
The issue before this Court is not as much whether the 
Idaho decree was valid, or whether Respondent defrauded the Idaho 
court at the time she obtained the decree. The issue before this 
Court is more to determine whether or not on the basis of the 
record before the trial court, whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Respondent's action for divorce in Utah. 
Appellant has utterly failed to produce to the trial court any 
compelling or substantial evidence whatsoever that his 
allegations were correct. It was his burden before the trial 
court to overcome the presumption of validity of the Idaho 
decree, and his failure to meet that burden has resulted in the 
dismissal of his action. There is no evidence on this record 
that would allow this Court to set aside the trial court's ruling. 
Accordingly, it is Respondent's request that 
Appellant's appeal be dismissed and that the Memorandum Decision 
of this Court of April 29, 1988 be confirmed. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed, first-class 
5# postage prepaid, to the following on this 
1988. 
R. Troy Staker 
208 South Main Street, #38 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
day of October, 
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